indicate some form of physical harm or severe repression (Exod. 2:19) although even there the idea of strong coercion with negative results is in view.
Passamaneck argues for this interpretation on the basis of the difficulty involved in grabbing a man's genitals. He concludes that the only conceivable circumstance for this law is when the man has her husband pinned on the floor or against a wall and thus his life is truly in danger. 1 Hirsch notes a similar understanding among the Rabbis; the Sifri in contrast to the Gemora understands this to be not an issue of shame but 'an example of behaviour when there is danger to life'. 2 The stretching out of the hand is 'taken literally as the means of saving the threatened life of the contestant'. 3 Having thus established the likelihood that at least potential physical harm to the husband is in view, we can see that the woman, fearing for her husband's safety, stretched out her hand (η≅δφψΦ ηξφλ;#∃φω:) and seized (ηθφψζιξϖηεω:) the man by his genitals (ωψ#∃φβυμ;β≅ι). Although later in the study we will consider the possibility that this action caused physical harm to her husband's opponent, this element is not explicitly indicated anywhere in the text itself. θζαξφ itself does not necessarily denote physical harm to the object or person being seized (e.g. 12) , the destructive idea is not carried by θζαξφ but by some other lexical element. Therefore any indication that there was damage to the man will need to be located elsewhere.
HOW SHOULD HER ACTIONS BE UNDERSTOOD AN ACT TO SAVE A LIFE
Given the nature of the fight as involving a significant threat to the husband's well-being, a prominent rabbinic tradition understands this law primarily from the perspective of saving someone's life. Maimonides saw both the grabbing of the genitals and the command to cut off the woman's hand from the perspective of saving a life: the husband's life in the former and the assailant's in the latter. 4 The Sifri likewise saw this act in terms of 'behaviour when there is danger to life' and therefore taught the duty 'of saving the life of anybody who is threatened with losing it by wounding the one who is threatening, or if no other means are possible, even by killing him'. 5 While the woman's desire to save her husband from serious physical affliction is without question, this perspective does not adequately explain why the action undertaken was wrong and is therefore dependent on one of the following interpretations for a more complete explanation. If anything, this interpretation only makes the case more difficult. If she is acting to save her husband's life, would her actions not be justified? Why, then, the harsh penalty? If the law is given in order to protect the life of the husband's assailant, why is there no indication that his life is in danger and why is such a severe penalty prescribed based on the mere threat of injury?
AN ACT OF UNWOMANLY ASSERTION
Many have argued that the previous law (Deut. 25:5-10) grants the widow 'great independence' 6 or 'a particularly bold sexual freedom' 7 in a manner that 'would seem repugnant to the modest retiring nature of Jewish women' 8 and needed to be protected from being understood as granting a 'false freedom'. 9 Against this background, the Law on Violent Intervention serves to reinforce a woman's proper role in society and keep the freedom demonstrated in the prior law 'to a narrowly circumscribed, carefully supervised area of life'. 10 Similarly, Carmichael argues that both this law and the previous one express the Deuteronomist's interpretation of the Judah and Tamar narrative (Gen. 38:6-26). 11 He grounds this connection in several shared elements: lack of progeny, conflict between brothers, and the sexual assertiveness of a woman. Arguing that both the prior law and the Judah and Tamar narrative granted an unusually bold freedom to the woman, Carmichael asserts that this law was given to demonstrate that such freedom 'is absolutely intolerable in any other circumstances'. 12 This law thus serves to enforce limits on a woman's proper role in society.
Against this interpretation, Eslinger contends that Carmichael's argument fails to convince because (1) it does not explain why this rather obscure case was chosen, (2) it would have been much easier to simply state the limitations of the prior law, and (3) if the case was to provide an enduring standard for other cases, a more representative case should have been chosen. 13 Eslinger's arguments, though, do not seem to do justice to Carmichael's position.
(1) It is entirely possible that this particular law was chosen because of the reference to a woman in the prior law and possibly also because the case of a woman seizing a man's testicles was in use as a textbook legal case at the time (e.g. MAL A8).
14 (2) This objection appears to make a categorical error by faulting a casuistic law for not being an apodictic law. (3) A number of the biblical laws appear to be of such narrow scope as to be of little representative value and yet this is more likely due to our limitations as interpreters than their limitations as laws. The law of the goring ox might at first glance appear to be similarly limited and yet is applicable to many aspects of life and was one of the most broadly cited case studies in the ancient near east. 15 The fact that this law is also found in the Middle Assyrian Laws may be an indication that it is not as obscure as Eslinger seems to think.
That being said, Eslinger is right that this interpretation is not entirely convincing. First, arguments based on the proximity of two laws are notoriously difficult to substantiate. Second, it is not enough to simply note that there are structural and thematic similarities between two laws; the specific point(s) of contact need to be established more clearly. Although Carmichael notes the presence of a shame-aspect and the possibility of a damage-aspect to the law, he simply opts for the idea of an unwomanly assertion as the primary point of the law without any real substantiation. This is probably because he is able to provide no evidence from Deuteronomy 25:11-12 itself for an unwomanly assertion and must rely instead on his narrative and contextual constructions. Thus, while this option is interesting, it does not appear that it has been sufficiently established
AN ACT OF IMPROPER INTERVENTION
Though following the same narrative approach as Carmichael, Christensen finds the primary focus of this law in the idea of fair practice. He approaches Deuteronomy 25 as a chiastic structure in which verses 11-15 deal with treating others fairly; verse 13 serves as a hinge verse connecting both 11-12 and 14-15 and is read differently in each context. Thus, he argues that 11-13 deal with intervening unfairly in a fight (where verse 13 refers to use of a weapon) and 13-15 deal with unfair business practices. 16 Similarly, Eslinger comes to the same basic conclusion as Christensen but using a different narrative background; he argues for Genesis 32:22-32 as the narrative framework of this law. 17 Eslinger finds the point of contact between the two texts in that both use Πκ≅α uniquely (Gen. 32:26, 33; Deut. 25:12). He reasons from these two references and its occurrence in Song of Solomon 5:5 that Πκ≅α can refer to 'the genitals, the scrotum or the labia respectively'. 18 Furthermore, he argues that it was Jacob who touched the Πκ≅α of his assailant during the wrestling match rather than the more traditional understanding. 19 The Jacob narrative and the Law on Violent Intervention thus share three details in common: 1) the situation of two men wrestling where one has the clear advantage; 2) the use of a 'below the belt' move; and 3) the unusual use of Πκ≅α.
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Both of these interpretations, however, run into some difficulties. Eslinger area both here and in the Jacob narrative. Although his argument addresses the question of why the law switches from δψφ (v. 11) to Πκ≅α (v. 12), his lexical argument is simply not sufficient to bear the burden of his hermeneutical claim. Regardless of whether or not Πκ≅α can refer to the genitals in Deuteronomy 25:12 and Song of Solomon 5:5 (a debatable point), his whole case centers on being able to establish that it does so in Genesis 32 and that Jacob is the subject of the action. But his arguments on both of these points are unconvincing. While the definition of Πκ≅α in this passage may be somewhat ambiguous, the traditional understanding that this word refers to the hip socket fits the context at least as well as Eslinger's proposal. His argument for Jacob as the subject of the action in verse 26a is at least plausible but the same cannot be said for his understanding of verse 33. There the use of the construct form Κ7ρεψΕ in 33b makes it very unlikely that Jacob is the subject of the touching rather than his assailant. Given the weakness of Eslinger's arguments with respect to Genesis 32, his use of this narrative as the background to the Law on Violent Intervention is unsustainable. Christensen's argument likewise runs into some difficulties. While he rightly points out that an element of fair treatment is present in the immediate context of this law (5-10; 13-15), he does not make a sufficiently strong argument for seeing this as the primary element of the law rather than the ideas of shame, loss of progeny, or danger which have also been seen to be aspects of this law and its surrounding context. The only argument he is able to provide for this point is the supposedly chiastic structure of chapter 25 but the various aspects of this chiastic structure do not seem to be sufficiently well established to suffice as the primary support for his case.
Both of these arguments share one other short-coming. If the understanding advanced above with respect to the risk of injury or death facing the husband is accurate, why would the woman's use of force still be deemed inappropriate? While such a wrestling move might be considered underhanded or unfair in a normal wrestling match, would this hold true in a situation where someone's life was at risk? Certainly the question of fairness disappears in the face of such a circumstance. Would she likewise be faulted for trying to save her husband by hitting the man while his back was turned? Would that not also be unfair? If we are to understand why the woman's action was deemed inappropriate and worthy of judgment, it seems that we must look for a stronger vantage point than this one.
AN ACT OF SHAME OR VIOLATION OF A TABOO
One of the most prevalent interpretations of this law understands it as an act that brings shame on the man or violates a sexual-taboo in a shameful manner and is thus an act of immodesty on the part of the woman. According to Daube, Deuteronomy as a whole constitutes a 'culture of shame' that is developed in this part of the book through the laws regarding shaming parents (21:18-21), the shame falling on a falsely accused virgin (22:13-21), undignified punishment (25:1-2), and the Law on Violent Intervention. 21 Hirsch contends that the shame theme can also be found in the previous law (vv. 5-10) where the uncovering of the man's feet in 25:9 thus constitutes a shame-act that is analogous to the grabbing of the man's genitals in 21 Cited in Calum M. Carmichael, The Laws of Deuteronomy (Itthaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), 46-47. 25:11. 22 The question of shame also arises from the word for genitals, ωψ#∃φβυμ;β≅ι. This word, a hapax legomena, is most likely derived from the stem #∃ωβ and has thus been translated as 'shame parts' 23 or that which 'excites shame'.
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Given the strong contextual element of shame in Deuteronomy and the likelihood of such an element in the preceding law it seems likely that this should play some role in our understanding of the present law. But once again we must ask what role the mitigating circumstances of the woman's action should play in our considerations. Assuming that the action was something that would bring shame on either the man or the woman, wouldn't the threat to the husband's well-being be sufficient to warrant such an action? Despite the fact that shame undoubtedly played a much more prominent role in ancient near eastern cultures than in our own one is hard pressed to find any scriptural precedent for the view that bringing shame on another person (or yourself) or committing a 'breach of modesty' 25 is grounds for enforcing such a significant penalty.
Driver recognizes this difficulty and thus moves the discussion from shame to tabu. 26 He infers from the fact that her action was treated severely despite the mitigating circumstances that the action was tabu and thus 'unpardonable under any circumstances'. 27 From this perspective, the woman's action should not be understood in terms of the shame she may have brought on herself or the man but in terms of breaching an inviolable social boundary such that it required significant punishment regardless of the intentions underlying the violation. Whether or not this proves to be a sustainable understanding of the woman's action will have to wait until after the discussion of the punishment.
AN ACT OF DAMAGE OR THREAT TO THE PROGENY
The law can also be understood in terms of the woman harming the man in such a way that he actually or potentially becomes unable to sire children. We have already seen that Carmichael argues that the potential loss of progeny is one of the points of contact connecting this law to the previous one and to the Judah and Tamar narrative. The idea also finds expression in Merrill's commentary when he argues that the clue to the context of verses 11-12 lies at least partially in 'the matter of the progeny and anything that might threaten it'. The primary difficulty with this interpretation is that there is no mention of physical injury in the law itself. Arguments for physical injury to the man are therefore derived in one of three ways: (1) the parallel with Middle Assyrian Law (MAL) 8, (2) the loss-of-progeny connection with verses 5-10, and (3) the severe nature of the prescribed penalty.
The parallel in the Middle Assyrian Laws has generated a considerable amount of discussion with respect to its applicability to the Law on Violent Intervention.
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If a woman should crush a man's testicle during a quarrel, they shall cut off one of her fingers. And even if the physician should bandage it, but the second testicle then becomes infected (?) along with it and becomes…, or if she should crush the second testicle during the quarrel -they shall gouge out both her […]-s. 30 Two intriguing similarities-a woman attacking a man by means of his genitals and a punishment that involves body mutilation-have caused some scholars to argue that this text is sufficiently parallel to Deuteronomy 25:11-12 to substantiate the claim that the biblical law assumes physical injury to the husband's assailant. Thus, Tigay argues that although there are significant differences between the two laws, only the perspective of the Assyrian law justifies the severity of the punishment found in both laws.
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This proposal, though, has been staunchly rejected by a number of biblical scholars. Paul contends that although there are several 'external similarities' between the two laws, the significant differences between them preclude the establishment of any significant parallel. Weinfeld and Driver though both point out that there is no explicit indication in either 7 or 9 that they are dealing with the same subject matter as 8 and they should thus be treated separately (Ibid. and Driver, Assyrian Laws, 30). Although Weinfeld also proposes another parallel from the Nuzi texts, Christensen asserts that the text is too ambiguous to be of any real help (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 293; Christensen, Deuteronomy, 613). 30 Martha T. Roth, ed., Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2d ed., Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Ancient World Series (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 156-157. Several of the details in the second part of this law are unclear. Most presume that the circumstances involve the man's second testicle becoming infected and unusable so that the man is completely unable to sire children. The talionic punishment in this case, though, is difficult to determine. Driver argues that since whatever is gouged out from the woman is plural and since the talionic principle seems to require something analogous to the injury inflicted, the punishment must have involved either the breasts or the nipples of the woman (Driver, Assyrian Laws, 31). 31 Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 485-486. 32 Paul, Religion and Law, 336-337. Tigay also notes these differences but he does not think that they necessarily eliminate any validity to the proposed parallel (The JPS Torah Commentary, 486).
Carmichael rejects the parallel even more strongly: 'Why interpreters persist in trying to understand the law in terms of damage to the man's reproductive capacity when it simply does not raise the topic in any way is puzzling. The interpreter's reasons for bringing in the Middle Assyrian laws, in which this topic is raised, are equally obscure'. 33 Despite these criticisms of the Assyrian parallel, it seems that it can be useful in two ways. First, its existence in another set of ancient near eastern laws, demonstrates that the Law on Violent Intervention is not as obscure as it first seems and was possibly an acknowledged part of an ancient near eastern legal tradition. The ways in which these two laws might be mutually informing should therefore not be ignored. As Westbrook notes: 'The provisions of the Ancient Near Eastern Law Codes on liability for death or injury…are an area of the law where evidence for inter-relation between the Codes is at its strongest. That they were all linked to a common schools tradition is apparent from the recurrence of the same standard legal problems'. 34 Second, if these two laws can be viewed as part of a shared tradition, it at least raises the possibility that damage was an implicit part of that tradition lying behind the biblical law. Having said that, it must also be acknowledged that this second point is not a strong one and does no more than raise a possibility. Whether or not damage is a part of the biblical law will need to be established on grounds other than the ancient parallels.
The second argument used in favor of seeing damage in this law is the loss-of-progeny connection with verses 5-10. This view argues that the loss of progeny was the primary element of that previous law and that structural and thematic similarities between the two passages suggest a similar theme here as well. Thus, the contact point between the two laws is a man's inability to sire children: in the first law either through death or refusal and in the second law through injury to the man's genitals. Phillips thus states that the prescribed punishment was warranted not simply because of her immodesty but because 'she may have damaged the man's genitals' leaving him 'in the position of being unable to father a son, and therefore of having his name blotted out'. 35 Arguing in a similar vein, Naude points to the fact that such a physical disfigurement would also have resulted in the man's becoming ceremonially unfit (Lev. 21:20; Deut. 23:1[2]).
The third argument advanced in favor of this position is that it alone explains the harsh nature of the penalty in verse 12. Since we will be considering that issue in the next section we will allow this to remain an open question temporarily.
But before leaving the question of damage, one other perspective needs to be briefly investigated. Taking the lack of any reference to physical damage seriously, some commentators have attempted to modify the argument for damage to the man so that what is really at stake is the possibility of injuring the man so that he is unable to sire children. Though this position tries to take seriously the law's silence on the matter of injury, it runs into problems of its own. Most critically, this interpretation must explain the strong penalty instituted simply for the mere potential of bodily damage. It is hard to understand how the possibility of damaging a man's reproductive system could be more serious than taking a man's life and yet the biblical laws do not institute penalties for actions that might result in death or injury but only for those that do.
Although we have considered the various options as distinct entities, it should be clear that they are not mutually exclusive. Most commentators operate, either consciously or unconsciously, with a view that mixes several elements together. One commonly finds interpreters arguing for shame and damage (e.g. Carmichael), improper intervention and shame (e.g. Christensen) or a variety of other combinations. 37 But inevitably every commentator will see one element as being the predominant issue and that is what must be established.
THE PUNISHMENT AND THE LEX TALIONIS
The first and most important question that must be addressed with respect to the woman's punishment is whether or not it should be understood as an application of the lex talionis. Although talionic formulas are only explicitly stated in three places (Exod. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:19-20; Deut. 19:21), many people argue that the talionic principle underlies a number of other laws as well including the Law on Violent Intervention.
Several authors have argued against seeing this law as an application of the lex talionis based on the fact that the principle of retaliation does not seem to be in force. Jackson argues that since the woman was not punished by the same injury she inflicted, this cannot be a talionic punishment. 38 Carmichael likewise contends that since the Deuteronomist was only concerned with the shamefulness of the woman's act and not the damage involved, retaliation is not in view. 39 Eslinger counters this argument with his unique understanding of Πκ≅α. Since he understands this to refer to the genitalia he argues that the punishment involves some form of female circumcision and is thus analogous to the injury inflicted and subject to the law of retaliation. 40 But there are some difficulties with this argument. First, as mentioned previously, his lexical arguments regarding Πκ≅α have failed to convince most scholars and cannot bear the weight of his interpretation. Second, Eslinger does not take into account the possibility that, given the obvious physical dissimilarities, Hebrew society may not have viewed female and male genitalia in the same way. If this was the case, then even if Eslinger's understanding of Πκ≅α is correct, his point would not hold. And third, the two studies Eslinger cites to support the practice of female circumcision in early societies deal with those practices in Egypt and Africa. He does not provide any indication that such a practice occurred in Israel or any Mesopotamian society. Without such substantiation, he has not established that this form of retaliatory action was even a legitimate possibility.
Citing a variety of ancient near eastern parallels supporting an extended use of the talionic principle, Paul dismisses both Jackson's and Eslinger's interpretations: 'All of these very dubious interpretations can be rejected out of hand. This regulation is actually an example of talionic extension or vicarious talionic punishment of the peccant member'. 41 Craigie also sees such an extended sense here and argues that since women have no external genitalia, cutting off the hand was understood to be an analogous compensation.
42 While Jackson' point regarding the differences between the crime and the punishment is well taken, he does not provide any good reason for supposing that the talionic principle could only be applied in cases where part-for-part retaliation was possible. In this situation, where the female genitalia may not have been viewed as analogous to the male genitalia, it is at least possible that the retaliatory principle could have been applied in another way. This law cannot therefore be excluded from the talionic realm on that basis alone.
Having discussed the major objection to interpreting this law in light of the lex talionis, we must now consider whether there are any positive reasons for understanding this principle to be at work here. Eslinger notes several significant structural parallels between this law and all three passages containing the talionic formulation. (1) Verse 11 and Exodus 21:22 begin with the same phrase (Μψ#∃ινφ)ϕ ω≅χν≅φψι−ψκ≅ι); (2) this same verb is also found in Leviticus 24:10; and (3) verse 12 and Deuteronomy 19:21 both contain the exhortation Κ1νεψ(∋ σωΟξτφ )λο.
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Such similarities are significant and at least suggest the possibility that the talionic principle is at work here as well.
One important difference, though, must also be accounted for. In both texts where the hand serves as part of the talionic formula, δψ φis used rather than Πκ≅α. Given that the Deuteronomist has already used δψφ twice in the previous passage, why switch to Πκ≅α if an allusion to the lex talionis is intended? The difficult question of why the Deuteronomist opted for a different word in verse 12 has not been taken seriously by most interpreters (with the obvious exception of Eslinger) and has as yet received no convincing answer. It does not seem, though, that using a different word for hand necessarily excludes this law from the talionic realm. It is clear that the Deuteronomist is not quoting a talionic formula here and therefore is not bound by the specific words of the lex talionis. 44 If he is merely alluding to the principle, he needs only appeal to the idea of physical retaliation. While we might wish for a clearer allusion, one is not necessary.
A final indication that the talionis is in view is the fact that without such a connection, this law would stand completely without precedent among the biblical laws. A number of commentators note that, in contrast to the laws of other ancient near eastern societies, this law is the one example outside of the lex talionis the prescribes mutilation as a punishment. 45 If this law is not understood as an application of the talionis, then this law is completely without parallel in the biblical legal corpus. 46 Rather than opt for this seemingly drastic conclusion, it seems much more reasonable to conclude that this law alludes to the talionic formulations through a series of semantic and structural markers and then demonstrates how the talionis applies to a very unique set of circumstances. 47 A final consideration, whether the command to cut off the woman's hand was to involve literal physical mutilation or whether it allowed the possibility of monetary compensation, lies outside the scope of this paper. Many current scholars follow the traditional rabbinic interpretation and argue that the lex talionis was always understood to allow (not require) direct physical retaliation in response to personal injury but at the same time to allow monetary compensation in its place. 48 A smaller group continues to maintain that the lex talionis did not allow monetary compensation and thus always involved physical retaliation. 49 Resolving this question would necessitate a thorough investigation of the lex talionis -its nature, purpose, and relationship to other ancient near eastern laws -and thus cannot be addressed here. For this paper, it must suffice to say that however the command to cut off the woman's hand should be understood, it must be read in the same manner as the lex talionis in its more explicit formulations.
In the previous section, we evaluated a number of proposals for understanding the nature of the woman's action and concluded that the strongest contenders were (1) a violation of a taboo or (2) an act that caused physical damage to the husband's assailant. Now that we have seen several reasons for understanding this law in light of the lex talionis it appears that although strong cases can be made for both of these perspectives and some dimension of each may be involved, the latter is the prominent issue. As Driver notes, 'the principle of talion…is peculiarly applicable to cases of assault' and more specifically to cases where injury is the result of that assault. 50 The laws of talion do not seem to apply to an action that only involved shame or the violation of a tabu serious as those offenses might be. Rather, the limited range of application available for the lex talionis implicitly supports the presumption of injury to the man. Although such injury is not explicitly indicated in the law, it may be that the Deuteronomist felt that the punishment indicated and the semantic links to the lex talionis were sufficiently clear as to need no other indicators. This appears to be the case in Leviticus 24 as well where no mention of injury is given regarding the fight in verse 10 and yet the lex talionis is applied in verses 19-20.
Does this talionic background explain why such an apparently harsh penalty is prescribed when there appear to be mitigating circumstances? While the other approaches struggle to explain why shame or unfairness would justify the prescribed punishment, the talionic approach can view it as a personal injury case analogous to the cases involving talion and thus has no difficulty explaining the reason for the penalty.
CONCLUSION
Having addressed the major interpretive problems in this text, this study has hopefully demonstrated that there are valid reasons for understanding this law in light of the lex talionis and thus as a law that may involve elements of shame or taboo but primarily rests on the issue of damage caused to the assailant. It would seem that this perspective can incorporate all of the major elements of the text -the contextual themes of shame and loss of progeny, the threat to the husband's life, the strong punishment, and the talionic background -more completely than the other options. 50 Driver, Assyrian Laws, 31.
